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Chapter 1
Introduction
Any message-driven protocol-cryptographic or otherwise-requires at least a basic
level of reliability of the communication between the parties, with regard to both
the integrity of the messages themselves and the guarantees the channels provide
related to message delivery. Classically, coding theory has dealt with the former
problem and cryptography with the latter; error-correcting codes allow reliable com-
munication even over faulty channels, and cryptography has explored the notions of
authentication and secrecy of the messages that go over the channels.
Traditionally, there has been no problem in combining the results of both fields,
since error-correcting codes handle the low-level details of communication itself whereas
cryptography uses communication as a tool to perform specific tasks. However, recent
work (such as that found in [5], [9], and [12]) has used cryptographic assumptions in
creating newer, more powerful error-correcting schemes. This overlap between the
two fields has subtle security implications: since the low-level mechanism for error
correction now has a cryptographic component, one must carefully analyze the de-
tails of cryptographic protocol composition when using the communication channel to
engage in cryptographic protocols.
On a binary channel (that is, a communication channel over which one only sends
Os and Is), it is well-known that no classical error-correcting code can decode a mes-
sage correctly if one-fourth of the bits become corrupted.1 Using a cryptographically
1While there are technical caveats to this statement, it is essentially true in the Hamming
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authenticated error-correcting scheme, however, it is possible to decode from any er-
ror rate less than one-half [12]. We wish to reap the benefits of this stronger error
correction at a lower level, but also to retain the security guarantees of any protocols
used at a higher level.
We therefore turn to the Universal Composability framework, a cryptographic
system that can be used to guarantee the behavioral semantics of various protocols.
In particular, a consequence of defining a protocol in the UC framework is compos-
ability-this protocol may be safely used as a subroutine of another protocol without
affecting its security.
Our goal is to model error-free message transmission as a functionality in the UC
framework. Using ideas from [12], we wish to design cryptographic protocols that
realize these functionalities. By doing so, we allow existing cryptographic protocols
to make use of recent advances in error correction without affecting their security
guarantees.
(adversarial-error) model.
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Chapter 2
A Brief Introduction to Error
Correction
One major topic of research within the field of information theory is that of error
correction. Error-correcting codes make message transmission more robust by com-
pensating for errors that occur between the time the message is sent and the time it
is received. Thus, even if a faulty transmission line, radio interference, or some other
factor garbles parts of the transmission, the message itself can be recovered perfectly.
2.1 The Model of Errors and Error Correction
In the standard model of error correction, a sender Send1 wishes to communicate
with a receiver R. They are separated by a channel C. Thus, any information Send
sends to R must first pass through C, where it may be subject to errors. That is,
individual symbols within the message may be corrupted such that they will read as
other symbols.
There are several popular models of the method by which C introduces errors into
the sent message. In the first model, due to Shannon [15], each symbol in the sent word
'In most papers in the field of coding theory, the sender is denoted simply by S. However, in the
field of cryptography (and specifically with regard to the universal composability framework), S is
typically used to denote a simulator, as defined in the next section. Since this paper will refer to
both of these parties extensively, they are here referred to as Send and Sim respectively.
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is corrupted independently at random with a certain probability p. Alternatively, in
the model due to Hamming [8], the channel is permitted to corrupt a certain fraction
e of the symbols in each sent message, and may do so in a "worst-case" manner.
More recently, another model for the error-introducing channel has been devel-
oped. First proposed by Lipton[10], in this model the channel introduces errors in an
adversarial manner, but is limited to a "feasible" amount of computation. Thus, it is
slightly weaker than the Hamming model, which uses a computationally unbounded
adversarial channel. However, many cryptographic protocols similarly assume that
adversarial processes are computationally bounded; we therefore feel justified in us-
ing this assumption in coding theory. The usefulness of this model over the classical
Hamming model can be seen in Section 2.4.
2.2 Error-Correcting Codes and Definitions
Any specific error-correcting code operates on messages of a specific length k. A
message is a string of k symbols from a finite alphabet E; in this paper we focus on
the specific case of E = 0, 1}. The message is encoded into a code word, or a string
of n > k symbols from Z; n is known as the block length.
The code word is then sent through a communication channel, which may corrupt
the code word by changing some of its symbols. One can measure the amount of
corruption by calculating the Hamming distance between the code word and the
received word. The Hamming distance between two words x and y of length n,
denoted A(x, y), is the number of symbols in which they differ. That is, A(x, y) =
{i : xi Yil.
A coding scheme is a pair of efficient2 algorithms E : E k - En and D : En -, Ek.
The information rate (or simply rate) R of a code is defined as k/n. A code (E, D)
tolerates error rate 6 if, for all m E Ek, A(E(m), r) < An -- D(r) = m.
One usually wishes to decode a received word to the code word that is closest
in Hamming distance. Thus, if one defines d as the minimum Hamming distance
2 That is, running in probabilistic polynomial time.
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between any two code words of the code, it is clear that one can in principle correct
for (d - 1)/2 errors; this value is known as the unique decoding radius of the code.
Thus, with the proper error-correcting code, one can uniquely decode from an error
rate of approximately d/2n.
2.3 Decoding Non-Uniquely: List Decoding
In some circumstances, it may be possible to decode from an error rate greater than
d/2n, provided that one relaxes the requirements for decoding. Rather than requiring
that the decoding algorithm output a unique message, one may allow it to output a
short list of possible messages. If the error rate is less than the list-decoding radius ,
then it is guaranteed that the original message will appear in the decoded list.
More formally, a code (E, D) with block length n and alphabet E is (n, L)-list
decodable if, for all r E En, there exist e < L code words x of E such that A(r, x) < en.
A code is efficiently list-decodable if there exists an efficient algorithm LD such that
for all r E En, LD(r) outputs all code words x such that A(r, x) < n.
Many common codes are known to be efficiently list-decodable to a list-decoding
radius far greater than the unique decoding radius. For example, the concatenated
codes of Guruswami and Sudan [7] (for binary alphabets) as well as Reed-Solomon
codes [6] (for large alphabets) both provide very good tradeoffs between information
rate and list-decoding radius.
2.4 Cryptography and Coding Theory
In coding theory, the communication channel introduces errors that can potentially
disrupt communication between two parties; indeed, for purposes of analysis the er-
rors are often assumed to be introduced in a worst-case fashion. Thus, the channel can
be seen as an adversary whose goal is to cause the receiver to decode incorrectly. In
this model, the distinction between the standard Hamming channel and the channel
described by Lipton becomes clear: the adversary of the former channel is computa-
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tionally unbounded, whereas the adversary of the latter channel can be described by
a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm.
However, the notion of an adversary-particularly one that is computationally
bounded-is very reminiscent of the field of cryptography. Indeed, work has recently
been performed in using cryptographic arguments and primitives in order to prove
that, despite the actions of the adversarial channel, the receiver decodes correctly with
high probability. For example, the "code scrambling" method of Gopalan, Lipton,
and Ding [5] uses a shared secret random string between the sender and receiver in
order to randomize the code word, such that the channel can only introduce errors
at random rather than adversarially chosen locations. The "private codes" described
by Langberg [9] use a different approach, defining a cryptographically authenticated
subset of the full code to transmit messages.
Independently, Micali, Peikert, Sudan, and Wilson considered a generalized ver-
sion of authenticated codes [12]. In this paper, the authors use list decoding to
generate a list of possible sent messages, then filter the list based on the authen-
ticity of a digital signature encoded with the message. While the authors focus on
the usefulness of this technique in enhancing the properties of error-correcting codes
(specifically, correcting for a higher error rate at a given information rate than classi-
cal codes allow), it is also useful to note that the recovered message is authenticated.
This fact is useful if one wishes to use the error-correcting codes to send messages
within cryptographic protocols. Thus, the protocols for the functionalities defined
later in this paper are similar to that found in [12].
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Chapter 3
The Universal Composability
Framework
Universal Composability (UC) is a framework developed largely by Canetti [1] for
analysis of cryptographic protocols. The overall goal of the UC paradigm is to provide
a modular framework for cryptography in which parties can be a part of multiple
different protocols at once without negatively impacting the security of the system as
a whole.
In general, it is possible for protocols to be provably secure when used in isolation,
but to be insecure when used concurrently with other protocols. For example, the
authentication protocol of Needham and Schroeder [13] works correctly if used alone,
but is insecure when used in parallel [11].
Protocols defined according to the specifications of the UC framework, however,
can be composed with other protocols without compromising their security. UC
protocols are known for many common cryptographic tasks; for examples, see [1]
and [3].
3.1 Real-World and Ideal-World Execution
The concept of having a "real world" and an "ideal world" is a common tool in cryp-
tographic analysis, dating back to the work of Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [4].
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In general, security in such a model is defined to mean that the powers possessed by
an adversary during execution of a real-world protocol are no greater than in an ideal
protocol in which its influence is severely limited. The UC framework formally and
explicitly defines the execution process in both real and ideal systems in a way that
allows composability results to be proven.
3.1.1 Ideal functionalities
The UC framework works by describing an ideal functionality, or a description of the
properties of a "perfect" cryptographic object. For example, one could use an ideal
functionality to precisely describe the security one expects from a digital signature
or a commitment scheme. One can define the basic, high-level behavior that any
protocol should achieve, what type of operations are and are not permitted, and
exactly how much information is "leaked" to the adversary at each step of execution.
3.1.2 The Interactive Environment Z
The UC system makes use of an environment machine Z. Z acts as an interactive
distinguisher; its goal is to decide whether it is interacting with a real- or ideal-world
system. Z, which is initiated with 1k (the security parameter of the system), provides
each party with arbitrary input of its choice, initiates the protocol, and observes the
output of each party.1 The view of Z is all the information that Z obtains through
this process. At the end of the protocol, Z observes the output of each other party
and then generates its own output, which without loss of generality consists of a single
bit.
3.1.3 Real-World Execution
During real-world execution, there exist a set of parties P1 ... P, an adversary A,
and the environment Z. Parties P1 ... Pn run an interactive protocol 7r, with inputs
1All parties, including adversaries and the environment, are modeled as interactive Turing ma-
chines. The specifics about the different tapes and other low-level details can be found in [1].
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generated by Z. The adversary A controls all network traffic (and can therefore choose
to delay or drop messages between parties), communicates arbitrary information with
Z, and has the power to corrupt parties (which allows access to the full history of the
party, as well as the ability to control that party in the future).
Figure 3-1: Real-world execution with two parties P1 and P2 running protocol 7r.
Let REAL,A,Z denote the probability ensemble of the output of Z when interacting
in the real-world model with parties running protocol 7r with adversary A, over all
security parameters.
3.1.4 Ideal-World Execution
During ideal-world execution, there exist a set of dummy parties P1 ... P, an adver-
sary (or simulator) Sim, an ideal functionality F, and the environment Z. As in
the real-world case, Z provides input to P1 ... P, and reads their output. However,
instead of running a protocol, P1 ... Pn simply send their input to f, and output
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any message F sends them. The adversary Sim has powers similar to those of the
real-world adversary; namely, it can delay or drop messages, communicate with Z,
and corrupt the dummy parties.
Figure 3-2: Ideal-world operation with two parties P1 and P2 and functionality F.
Let IDEAL,Sim,Z denote the probability ensemble of the output of Z when inter-
acting in the ideal-world model with adversary Sim and dummy parties passing input
to f, over all security parameters.
3.1.5 Hybrid-World Execution
A hybrid world is similar to the real world described in Section 3.1.3, except the parties
Pi and A additionally have access to one or more copies of some ideal functionalities.
We motivate this "hybrid" model below.
When designing complicated protocols, it is often useful to assume access to ideal
sub-functionalities. This assumption simplifies analysis and makes constructions more
22
modular. Additionally, in some cases a hybrid model is used to represent physical
conditions, where due to the properties of the physical system one can assume a
certain behavior (e.g. the functionalities defined in Section 3.2).
Let HYB-A Z denote the probability ensemble of the output of Z when interacting
in the hybrid-world model with adversary A and parties running protocol 7r with
access to ideal functionality F, over all security parameters.
3.1.6 Definition of Security
We say that a protocol 7r securely realizes F if, for every real-world adversary A there
exists an ideal-world adversary Sim such that, for all environments Z, REAL,,A,Z 
IDEALy,Sim,Z (that is, the two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable). If
REAL,A,Z - IDEAL.F,Sim,Z (that is, if the two ensembles are identical), we say that
the simulation is perfect.
The UC framework guarantees that protocols that securely realize ideal function-
alities are composable. That is, they can be run simultaneously with other protocols,
and in particular they can be used as sub-protocols to realize a part of a larger
protocol. When analyzing large protocols, however, it is useful to assume the ideal
functionality of the smaller protocol instead of re-analyzing the steps. The Universal
Composability Theorem [1] proves that if protocol p securely realizes functionality
F, then REALp,A, HYBsAZ, where 7r is a protocol in the F-hybrid world and
7rp represents a real-world protocol in which every call to F in 7r is replaced by an
execution of p.
Thus, instead of proving indistinguishability between the real- and ideal-world
views of Z, we will often prove indistinguishability between the hybrid- and ideal-
world views. If these two ensembles are indistinguishable, we say that the protocol
securely realizes the functionality in the hybrid model.
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3.2 The -FAUTH-, CLOSE-, and FCWT-Hybrid Mod-
els
The following three ideal functionalities model different types of communication chan-
nels. If a protocol runs in a hybrid model with one of these functionalities, it can run
in the physical world assuming the appropriate type of communication channel exists
between the parties.
The first functionality, FAUTH, models an error-free, authenticated communication
channel. That is, if a message is delivered, the receiver knows the identity of the sender
and that the message has not been corrupted. The FAUTH-hybrid model is sometimes
called the authenticated-links model, and is frequently assumed in order to realize
other functionalities (e.g. in [1] and [3]).
While -FAUTH has been used extensively in previous work, the next two function-
alities are introduced by this paper. The second functionality, XFCLOSE, models a
communication channel in which some errors can occur. Specifically, it allows the
adversary to forward "corrupted" versions of sent messages to the receiver, but these
corrupted words must be sufficiently close in Hamming distance to some previously
sent message (as defined by parameter ). Additionally, CLOSE only delivers mes-
sages of a specific length n; in order to deliver messages of different lengths one uses
multiple copies of C'LOSE initialized with different values n.
The third functionality, JWT, is similar to YCLOSE in that it models an error-
prone communication channel. However, FCWT has two major differences. First, there
exists an adversarially chosen, error-free tag associated with each message; parties
may use the tag to refer to a message without knowing that message's contents.
Secondly, it is reactive; that is, the receiver (not the adversary) initiates receiving a
message. This functionality is used to model a storage medium as a communication
channel, where one can store (send) a piece of data and later desire to read (receive)
that specific piece of data again. (For a full exploration of the storage model, see
Sections 4.3 and 8.)
Both CLOSE and FCWT are defined to be immediate; that is, they deliver their
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outputs directly to the incoming communication tapes of parties rather than allowing
the adversary to asynchronously deliver the messages. Because the adversary can
already control the timing of message delivery via the corrupt commands, non-
immediacy would be redundant.
3.2.1 Functionality AUTH
The following definition for FAUTH is adapted from the definition found in [2].
AUTH proceeds as follows:
1. Upon receiving (send, sid, R, m) from a party Send, send (sent, sid, Send, R, m)
to the adversary.
2. Upon receiving (send, sid, R', m') from the adversary:
(a) If Send is corrupted, then output (sent, sid, Send, m') to R'.
(b) Otherwise, output (sent, sid, Send, m) to R, and halt.
3.2.2 Functionality JCLOSE
TCLOS E runs with parties Send and R and adversary Sim. It is parameterized by
a real number e E [0, 1] that represents the error rate it allows, and in the hybrid
world is initialized with integer n. It maintains a set sent. Its operation proceeds as
follows:
1. Upon receiving (sid, init, no) from Send:
(a) n -no
(b) sent v- {}
(c) Send (sid, init, no) to the adversary.
2. Upon receiving (sid, send, msg) from Send:
(a) If msg ¢ {0, 1}n, do nothing. Otherwise, continue.
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(b) sent v- sent U {msg}
(c) Send (sid, send, msg) to the adversary.
3. Upon receiving (sid, corrupt, x') from the adversary:
(a) If there exists x E sent such that A(x, x') < en, then write (sid, message, x')
to the incoming communication tape of R. If there does not exist such an
x, or if x' ({0, 1)n, do nothing.
3.2.3 Functionality FCWT
-CWT (which stands for "close with tag") runs with parties Send and R and adversary
Sim. It is parameterized by a real number e E [0, 1] that represents the error rate it
allows, and in the hybrid world is initialized with integer n. It maintains two arrays,
sent [ and avail []. Its operation proceeds as follows:
1. Upon receiving (sid, init, no) from Send:
(a) n no
(b) avail I
(c) sent[] *-l
(d) Send (sid, init, no) to the adversary.
2. Upon receiving (sid, send, r, msg) from Send:
(a) If msg {0, 1)n , do nothing. Otherwise, continue.
(b) sent [T] e- msg
3. Upon receiving (sid, corrupt, T, x') from the adversary:
(a) If A(sent [], x') < en, then set avail [] - x'. If A(sent [r] ,x') > en,
if sent [] = , or if x' ~ {0, 1)n , do nothing.
4. Upon receiving (sid, receive, T) from R:
(a) Write (sid, message, avail [] ) to the incoming communication tape of R.
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3.3 The functionality YCERT
In addition to the above functionalities, which are used to model communication
channels, we will also make extensive use of -FCERT- CERT is an ideal functionality
that models certification of message; that is, it binds messages to the identities of
parties. The following definition for YCERT is taken from [2], with one modification:
in our version, every signature a provided by the adversary must be of a fixed length.
(This property is needed in order to ensure that the message and signature are short
enough to be encoded using a particular error-correcting code.)
1. Upon receiving a value (sign, sid, m) from Send:
(a) Verify that sid = (Send, sid') for some sid'. If not, then ignore the request.
Otherwise, continue.
(b) Send (sign, sid, m) to the adversary.
(c) Receive (signature, sid, m, a) from the adversary. If does not have
length equal to the security parameter, halt.
(d) If an entry (m, a, 0) is recorded, then output an error message to Send and
halt. Otherwise, continue.
(e) Send (signature, sid, m, a) to Send.
(f) Record the entry (m, a, 1).
2. Upon receiving a value (sid, verify, m, a) from some party P:
(a) Send (verify, sid, m, a) to the adversary.
(b) Receive (verified, sid, m, q) from the adversary, then do the following:
i. If (m, a, 1) is recorded, then set f = 1.
ii. Else, if the signer is not corrupted, and no entry (m, a', 1) for any a'
is recorded, then set f = 0 and record the entry (m, a, 0).
iii. Else, if there is an entry (m, a, f') recorded, then set f = f'.
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iv. Else, set f = , and record the entry (m, a', 0).
(c) Send (verified, sid, m, f) to P.
This functionality provides the semantics of "certified" messages; that is, messages
with an authentication tag that guarantees that they may only come from a particular
sender. In practical terms, this can be thought of as providing the guarantees of
digital signatures, with the addition of a "certification authority" that guarantees
that a particular public key belongs to a particular party.2
Note: Concurrent work by Patil [14] has demonstrated a flaw in the definition of
.FCERT from [2], on which the above definition is heavily based. However, it should
be noted that the flaw, and subsequent fix, deal only with the interaction of the
functionality and the adversary and with the secrecy properties of the signatures;
the certification itself still correctly identifies a message as coming from a particular
sender. Since the functionality of certification itself is all that is needed to realize
the error-free communication functionalities, any future "fixed" definitions of FCERT
(such as the one proposed in [14]) can be substituted for the above.
2Formally, one realizes JFCERT in the FsIG, Fc A-hybrid model, as seen in [2]
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Chapter 4
Overview of Ideal Functionalities
for Error-Free Communication
We define four new ideal functionalities for error-free message transmission: .FEFRR,
.FEFR1, FEFO, and EFS- Each is intended to provide successively higher levels of
guarantees for message delivery, and models a situation found in the real world.
4.1 Motivation for Defining Functionalities for Error-
Free Communication
Most protocols in the Universal Composability framework operate in the FAUTH-
hybrid model. That is, they assume authenticated, error-free communication, such
that a real-world adversary cannot forge messages from one party to another. The
.FAUTH-hybrid model is normally justified by either physical or cryptographic assump-
tions.
However, real-world communication is prone to errors. Radio waves experience
interference, there is line noise on transmission wires, physical media experiences wear
or simply degrades with time. In the FAUTH-hybrid model, corrupted messages are
simply dropped; thus, in a situation where some errors are unavoidable one cannot
communicate at all.
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We wish to allow communication even in a realistic model where errors can occur.
Thus, we use the YFLOsE-hybrid model, where the adversary is allowed to introduce
a certain number of errors into each sent message. In this model, we define protocols
that enable the recipient to recover the original, uncorrupted message despite the
adversarially-introduced errors. The error-free property of the data transmission is
formalized by defining several ideal functionalities.
In addition to providing error-free message delivery in a weaker hybrid model,
the successive functionalities also provide additional guarantees regarding ideal-world
message delivery, such as prevention of adversarial reordering or duplication of mes-
sages. The semantics of these ideal functionalities, combined with a protocol that
provably realizes each functionality, yield the same message-delivery properties in the
real world.
In addition, due to the Universal Composition theorem [1], the protocols for the
functionalities below are composable; thus, the corresponding protocols may be used
to provide error correction when transmitting data for other cryptographic protocols
without affecting those protocols' security.
4.2 Design Choices for the Functionalities for Error-
Free Communication
All four of the new functionalities for error-free communication share some common
behavior. The major common themes are highlighted and motivated below:
* Whenever a message is sent to the functionality, the functionality sends that
message to the adversary. This reflects the fact that the functionalities are not
concerned with secrecy but rather with error-free communication.
* The adversary may drop messages, or delay them for arbitrarily long periods
of time. This not only is consistent with the adversary of the UC framework,
but also reflects realistic communication channels, where network delays are
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unpredictable and it is possible for messages to be dropped or to become garbled
beyond hope of decoding.
· The adversary may attempt to duplicate or replay messages, corresponding to
the real-world possibility of echoes or even protocols (such as TCP) that cause
a message to actually be transmitted multiple times (even if theoretically one
only wants one copy). Since we use the error-free communication functionali-
ties to model a variety of different message transmission guarantees, we choose
to provide these guarantees using the functionalities themselves rather than
restricting the adversary.
* The adversary may not create new messages. Again, the error-free function-
alities are meant to model a basic communication channel of the type used in
coding theory, where the adversary attempts to corrupt messages but does not
create new ones of its own. Once the adversary begins actively sending mes-
sages to other parties, the problem becomes an explicitly cryptographic one, and
cryptographic protocols to solve this problem may be composed with protocols
to realize the error-free functionality.
* The adversary may corrupt a party (either sender or receiver), learning its entire
state history and controlling that party in the future. This corresponds to the
fact that, for whatever reason, communicating parties may fail to follow the
agreed-upon communication protocol. However, we must formally define what
may happen in the communication functionality if a party fails to follow the
protocol.
In the physical world, the receiver's output is completely determined by the
sender and the adversarial channel. Thus, once the sender is corrupted, the re-
ceiver's output is entirely controlled by the adversary. For simplicity, therefore,
our functionalities include a sendNow command that enables the adversary to
directly control the receiver's output, but only when the sender is corrupted.
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Adv. can Adv. can Adv. can Who chooses Realizable for
Functionality duplicate? reorder? drop? message? 1/4 < < 1/2?
.EFRR Yes Yes Yes Adversary Yes
YEFR1 No Yes Yes Adversary Yes
YEFo No No Yes Adversary Yes
YEFS (No) (No) Yes Receiver No
Table 4.1: Different properties of the error-free functionalities.
4.3 Contrasting the New Ideal Functionailities
Table 4.1 provides a comparison of the four functionalities for error-free communica-
tion presented in this paper. All four functionalities provide error-free data transmis-
sion, but each provides different semantics and additional guarantees.
*· EFRR stands for "Error-Free Communication with Reordering and Replaying."
The adversary is free to drop, reorder, or duplicate messages at will. Each
message that is received, however, is guaranteed to have been sent at some point
by the sender. Thus, this functionality provides guarantees similar to those one
would expect of a packet-switched network. In addition, the semantics of FEFRR
are essentially the same as those of YAUTH. Effectively, .FEFRR achieves -AUTH
in the FrCLOsE-hybrid model, meaning that communication can occur normally
even if the communication channels between the parties are error-prone.
* FEFR1 stands for "Error-Free Communication with Reordering and One-Time
Delivery." The adversary may drop or reorder messages at will, but may not
replay them. (A comparison can be made to the physical mail system: items
might get lost or arrive in a different order from when they are sent, but no du-
plication can take place.) Thus, -FEFR1 builds off of the guarantees of FEFRR but
additionally prevents the adversary from repeating messages that have already
been received.
*· EFO stands for "Error-Free Communication with Ordered Message Delivery."
Messages are received in the order in which they are sent. The adversary may
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drop messages, but may neither reorder nor replay them. Thus, the guarantees
of this functionality can be thought of as modeling an ephemeral transmission
such as a radio broadcast, where each message in turn is either received or lost
forever.
·* EFS stands for "Error-Free Storage" and provides a somewhat different model
from the previous three functionalities. Rather than modeling various forms
of broadcast transmission, it is intended to capture the semantics of storage
on physical media. Thus, the sender "sends" (stores) a message, the adversary
may corrupt it (corresponding to degradation or wear of the storage medium),
and then the receiver may "receive" (access) it.
One key difference between FEFS and the previous functionalities is that the
receiver, rather than the adversary, chooses which message to receive and when.1
However, the question then arises as to how the receiver is to specify the message
(since if he knew the message already, there would be no need to go to the
functionality to receive it). Therefore, in order to model the concept of data
storage in the real world, EFS uses the .FwT-hybrid model rather than the
FcFLOsE-hybrid model. Thus, each sent message has an associated error-free
"tag" that is used as an identifier. (The tag is chosen adversarially, so the
sender cannot communicate via the tag.) This tag corresponds to whatever the
real-world receiver would use to identify the data-for example, it could be the
logo on a CD case or the sector of the hard drive where the data is stored.
Regardless, in most real-world scenarios this "tag" is independent of the data
it identifies; thus, the F~CwT-hybrid model accurately models the behavior of
real-world storage systems.
However, as shown below, FEFS cannot be non-trivially realized in this hybrid
model if the error rate equals or exceeds 1/4.
1Thus, the concept of adversarial reordering or duplication is meaningless, although the adversary
still has the power to drop messages. It should also be noted that the receiver is permitted to
request the same message multiple times, which could be considered a form of "duplication"; hence,
we specifically refer to adversarial duplication as being prevented by having the receiver request
messages.
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It is clear that these functionalities increase in strength in the order of presenta-
tion; -EFR1 provides the guarantees of FEFRR and additionally disallows duplication,
and FEFO provides the guarantees of EFR1 and additionally disallows reordering. In
FEFS, the adversary is prevented from choosing when the receiver decodes messages,
thus preventing adversarial reordering and duplication by default.
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Chapter 5
EFRR: Error-Free Communication
with Reordering and Replaying of
Messages
5.1 Definition
SFEFRR is used for transmitting messages of length k. It maintains a set pending. Its
operation proceeds as follows:
1. Upon receiving (sid, init, Ik) from Send:
· pending - {}()
* Send (sid, init, k) to the adversary.
2. Upon receiving (sid, send, msg) from Send:
* If msg f (0, )}k, do nothing. Otherwise, continue.
* pending v- pending U {msg}
* Send (sid, send, msg) to Sim.
3. Upon receiving (sid, allow, msg) from Sim:
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* If msg E pending, send (sid, message, msg) to R. Otherwise, do nothing.
4. Upon receiving (sid, sendNow, msg) from Sim:
* If Send is corrupted, send (sid, message, msg) to R. Otherwise, do nothing.
5.2 Protocol for YFEFRR
FEFRR can be realized by the following protocol, denoted RR = (TeRnd, rRR), in the
YCERT, FcLOsE-hybrid model:
* The sender Send runs 7 RSeRnd
- On receiving (sid, init, lk) from Z:
* Generate new 9rCERT session ID sid' = (Send, sid).
* Based on an error rate of e and a message length of k plus the security
parameter, calculate the resulting block length n needed by the error-
correcting code. Send (sid, init, n) to FCLOsE.
- On receiving (sid, send, msg) from Z:
* Send (sign, sid', msg) to 7FCERT.
* Receive (signature, sid', msg, o) from FCERT.
* Using an error-correcting code with encoding function E (that has
efficient list-decoding algorithm LD), compute x = E(msg o a).
* Send (sid", send, x) to TCLOSE-
* The receiver R runs 7rRRR:
- On receiving (sid", message, x') from TCLOSE:
* Run LD(x'), where LD is an efficient list-decoding algorithm for the
error-correcting code used. This generates a set of possible decodings,
which can be parsed as {ml o a, m 2 o 0 2,... me o ae}e-
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* verified e- {}
* For i = 1 to e
Send (verify, sid', mi, i) to JrCERT-
Receive (verified, sid', mi, fi) from JFCERT-
If fi = 1, verified e- verified U {mi}
* If verified is empty, output . Else choose m E verified such that
m is the first element of verified in lexicographic order, and output
m.
5.3 Proof of Security
Theorem 1. The above protocol securely realizes FEFRR in the JFCERT, T'LOSE-
hybrid world; moreover, the simulation is perfect. That is, for every hybrid-world
FCERT.FLOSE -adversary A, there exists an ideal-world adversary Sim such that HYB 7.RRAZ
IDEALFEFRR,Sim,Z -
Proof. Here we define a simulator Sim that interacts with Z, YEFRR, and "dummy"
parties Send and R in a manner indistinguishable from parties performing the hybrid-
world protocol 1rRR.
Sim emulates the execution of the hybrid-world protocol internally, as shown in
Figure 5-2. Specifically, he:
* runs an internal copy of A in a black-box manner, and sends messages back and
forth between A and Z untouched.
· runs internal copies of the ideal functionalities FCERT and 7CrLOSE (which inter-
act with the internal A).
* runs internal copies of the code 7rRSd and 7rR which communicate with the
ideal functionalities that are also emulated by Sim in an internal "hybrid world"
with adversary A.
1One could easily use some other method to select a message from the verified set, such as simply
taking an element at random. The only requirement is that the method be easily simulatable.
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Figure 5-1: Hybrid-world operation of 7rRR.
Sim operates in the ideal world as follows:
* When Sim receives a message (sid, init, lk) from EFRR, he forwards that mes-
sage to his internal copy of 1rRSnd .
* When Sim receives a message (sid, send, msg) from UCLOSE, he forwards that
message to his internal copy of 7TSeRnd
* When the internal 7rRR outputs (sid,message, msg), Sim checks if Send has
been corrupted. If so, Sim sends (sid, sendNow, msg) to .FEFRR; otherwise, it
sends (sid, allow, msg) to fEFRR-
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* When the internal A requests to corrupt one of the parties (Send or R), Sim
corrupts that party in the ideal world and supplies the state of the corresponding
internal party (eRnd or 7rR) to the internal A.
Figure 5-2: Ideal-world operation with simulator Sim.
We now consider each action Z may perform and its resulting view. Although Z
may technically send any message it wants, only a few messages are defined by the
protocol and functionality and will therefore result in operation. These are enumer-
ated below:
1. Z may send a (sid, init, 1k ) command to a party Send.
In the ideal world, this command is forwarded through YEFRR to the copy of
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7rSend within Sim, whereas in the hybrid world Send runs 7Se4nd directly on this
input. In either case, 7rSend is run on the same input, causing a message to
be sent to TLOSE, which is then forwarded to A. Thus, Z's views of the two
worlds are identical.
2. Z may send (sid, send, msg) to Send.
Hybrid world: Send runs 7 d,Se generating an encoding E(msg o a) and for-
warding it to ,LOsE
.
FCLOSE stores this value and forwards it to A (who may
then communicate it to Z).
Ideal world: The dummy Send forwards (sid, send, msg) to YEFRR, which in
turn forwards it to Sim (after storing msg). Sim sends this instruction to his
internal copy of rs eR d which generates E(msg o a) and forwards it to the (sim-
ulated) functionality CLOS E. JCLOSE will forward this value to the A internal
to Sim, which may then communicate it to Z (since Sim faithfully forwards
messages between his internal A and Z). Thus, the ideal-world view of Z is
identical to the hybrid-world view, since it is based on identical (hybrid-world)
sender code generating a message seen by an identical A.
3. Z may communicate arbitrary information with the adversary.
Since Sim faithfully passes messages between his internal copy of A and Z, the
view of Z generated strictly from communication with A is identical if the view
of A in the hybrid world is identical to the view of the simulated A in the ideal
world. However, in both cases A only sees its own communication with Z and
a message from 'CLOSE containing a code word generated by rSeRd. Thus, the
views are identical.
4. Z may ask A to corrupt one of the parties (Send or R). However, Sim is
defined to reveal the state of the corresponding internal party, which is identical
to the party's state in the hybrid world. Similarly, since Sim is also running
A internally, it becomes a simple matter to allow A to control the execution of
the internal "sender" or "receiver." Thus, the views of Z are identical in the
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ideal and hybrid worlds even if a party is corrupted.
5. Z may tell A to send (sid, corrupt, x') to 'C'LOSE'
First, note that if x' is not sufficiently close to a sent message as to be forwarded
by .FGLOSE, or if it is forwarded but 7rR fails to output a message, then the
output of R in the hybrid and ideal worlds is trivially identical. However, if
VrRR outputs (sid, message, msg) for some message msg, then from the definition
of the protocol, FCERT certified msg as coming from Send. There are two cases:
if Send is uncorrupted, then by definition of FCERT and rRend, Send had issued
a (sid, send, msg) command to FEFRR, and hence msg E pending. Thus, when
Sim issues the allow command, FEFRR will send (sid, message, msg) to the
dummy R.
If Send is corrupted, then there is no guarantee that msg E pending because
-FCERT allows the adversary to determine whether or not arbitrary messages are
certified. However, in this case, Sim issues a sendNow command, which causes
FEFRR to bypass the pending set and simply deliver the message.
Thus, the output of R is identical in the hybrid and ideal worlds.
Thus, the view of Z is identical between hybrid and ideal worlds.
5.4 Discussion
In order for the receiver to be able to separate messages sent by Send from other
decoded messages, Send sends a digital signature along with the message. The sig-
nature provides authentication for certain decoded messages, which is not only useful
in itself, but also allows R to decode correctly. 7TRR specifies that the message and
signature are encoded as a unit; this enables candidate message-signature pairs to
be decoded easily and, with a proper relation between message length and security
parameter, does not result in asymptotic loss of information rate[12].
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It is worth noting that the decoding algorithm used, and the related parameters
such as the error rate E, are independent of the above security proof. Indeed, the
security of this protocol relies on the authentication provided by -FCERT; the error-
correction properties are used only to guarantee that R produces output in a model
where some errors are unavoidable.
In addition, in the given protocol 7rRR, both sender and receiver are stateless; they
do not need to retain any information between one invocation of the protocol and the
next.
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Chapter 6
¶EFR1: Error-Free Communication
with Reordering and One-Time
Delivery
6.1 Definition
.FEFR1 maintains a multiset pending. Its operation proceeds as follows:
1. Upon receiving (sid, init, Ik) from Send:
· pending - {}
* Send (sid, init, k) to the adversary.
2. Upon receiving (sid, send, msg) from Send:
* If msg f {0, 1} k, do nothing. Otherwise, continue.
* pending *- pending U {msg}
* Send (sid, send, msg) to Sim.
3. Upon receiving (sid, allow, msg) from Sim:
* If msg E pending:
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- pending *- pending - {msg}
- Send (sid, message, msg) to R.
Otherwise, do nothing.
4. Upon receiving (sid, repeat) from Sim:
* Send (sid, repeat) to R.
5. Upon receiving (sid, sendNow, msg) from Sim:
* If Send is corrupted, send (sid, message, msg) to R. Otherwise, do nothing.
The ideal adversary Sim may attempt to duplicate messages by issuing the allow
command more than once for the same message. However, multiple allow commands
do not result in the message being received more than once.
6.2 Protocol for FEFR1
-.EFR1 can be realized by the following protocol, denoted by T7R1 = (lnd, 7R1). 7R1
operates in the FCERT, FCLOsE-hybrid model.
* The sender Send runs rSend
- On receiving (sid, init, 1k) from Z:
* Generate a new EFCERT session ID sid' = (Send, sid).
* Based on error rate and message length equal to k plus twice the
security parameter, calculate the resulting block length n needed by
the error-correcting code. Send (sid, init, n) to CLOSE-
- On receiving (sid, send, msg) from Z:
* Choose a fresh nonce r of length equal to the security parameter. Make
sure that r has not been previously used as a nonce; record it so that
it is not reused in the future.
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* Send (sign, sid', msg o r) to .FCERT
* Receive (signature, sid', msg o r, a) from JFCERT
* Using an error-correcting code with encoding function E (that has
efficient list-decoding algorithm LD), compute x = E(msg o r o o).
* Send (sid", send, x) to .):LOSE'
* The receiver R runs 7rRR1
R maintains a set received that is initialized to the empty set.
- On receiving (sid", message, x') from GCLOSE:
1. Run LD(x'), where LD is an efficient list-decoding algorithm for the
error-correcting code used. This generates a set of possible decodings,
which can be parsed as {m1 o r o 1, m2 o r2 o 2,... me o re o ae}.
2. verified - {}
3. For i = 1 to e
* Send (verify, sid', mi o ri, ai) to FJCERT.
* Receive (verified, sid', mi ri, fi) from CERT.
* If fi = 1, verified +- verified U {mi o ri}
4. If verified is empty, output I and halt. Otherwise, continue.
5. verified e- verified - received
6. received v- received U verified
7. If verified is nonempty:
* For each msg or E verified, output (sid, message, msg). Output
the messages in order of increasing nonce.1
Otherwise, output (sid, repeat).
1Alternatively, one could choose a different order; the only requirement is that the method used
to order is easily simulatable.
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6.3 Proof of Security
Theorem 2. The above protocol securely realizes FEFR1 in the TFCERT, CLOSE-hybrid
model; moreover, the simulation is perfect. That is, for every adversary A there exists
a simulator Sim such that HYBrA f CLOSE _ IDEALEFR,Sim,Z for all environments
Z.
Proof. Again, we describe a simulator Sim that emulates the execution of the hybrid-
world model, running A, YCERT, .CLOSE, 7rSend and 7RRl internally. The simulator-
and analysis thereof-is very similar to that described in the proof of Theorem 1, so
the redundant details are not reproduced here.
.FEFR1 differs from FEFRR in two major ways: the addition of a repeat command,
and the fact that once a message is allowed it is removed from the pending multiset.
We cover each of these differences in turn.
First, if the simulated copy of 7rR outputs (sid, repeat), Sim simply forwards this
value to EEFR1- EFR1 sends this value to the dummy R, which outputs it. Thus,
the view of Z is the same, since in both the hybrid and ideal worlds the receiver R
outputs (sid, repeat).
We now show that in the hybrid world, if the sender is uncorrupted and 7RRl
outputs (sid,message, msg) for some message msg, then msg must appear in the
pending multiset of .FEFR1. By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1,
msg has appeared in pending at some point in the past. Thus, we show that at least
one copy of msg has not yet been removed from pending.
Recall that 7rR filters out messages with nonces it has previously seen. Thus, if 7rR
outputs (sid, message, msg), it decoded msg concatenated with a previously-unseen
nonce (and a valid signature indicating that the message indeed came from Send).
However, since each nonce used by 7rRSn d is unique, this decoding of msg corresponds
to a specific execution of rlS1nd on msg, an execution which has not previously led
to output by 7rl. Since each execution of s7rrend corresponds to a different send
command to FEFR1, every allow command sent by Sim can be matched up to a
unique send command to FEFR1 that had previously occurred. Thus, whenever Sim
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sends (sid, allow, msg) to FEFR1, msg E pending and therefore the dummy R will
output (sid, message, msg). Thus, the views of Z in the hybrid and ideal worlds are
identical.
EO
6.4 Discussion
The main difference between the operation of 7rR1 and 7rRR is the inclusion of a nonce.
The nonce, signed and encoded along with the message, allows the protocol to detect
and discard repeated messages. If the same message is sent by Send multiple times,
each copy can be received once, since different copies of the message will have different
nonces.
However, the inclusion of the nonce also requires that both Send and R keep
state. Namely, 7rRSnd must in principle keep track of all nonces it has used (in order
to avoid reusing one of them) and RR1 must keep track of all authentic nonces it has
decoded in order to detect future duplicates. In particular, while the sender may only
be required to keep a limited amount of state (if, for example, it used a counter or a
timestamp for the nonce), the receiver's state is in principle unbounded since it must
keep all nonces it has seen due to the possibility of message reordering.
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Chapter 7
.FEFO: Error-Free Communication
with Ordered Message Delivery
7.1 Definition
Unlike the previous two functionalities, FEFO is immediate. This is to ensure its
semantics; we wish to guarantee that R receives messages in the order in which
they are sent. If the functionality were not immediate, the adversary could reorder
messages between EFO and the dummy R. (On the sending side, the UC framework
guarantees that all incoming messages to functionalities are delivered immediately.)
FEFO keeps a FIFO queue pending. Its operation proceeds as follows:
1. Upon receiving (sid, init, Ik) from Send:
· pending e- {}
* Send (sid, init, ik) to the adversary.
2. Upon receiving (sid, send, msg) from Send:
* If msg f {O0, 1}k, do nothing. Otherwise, continue.
* Append msg to the end of pending.
* Send (sid, send, msg) to Sim.
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3. Upon receiving (sid, allow) from Sim:
* Remove the first element of pending and call it msg.
* Write (sid, message, msg) to the incoming communication tape of R.
4. Upon receiving (sid, drop) from Sim:
* Remove the first element of pending.
5. Upon receiving (sid, sendNow, msg) from Sim:
* If Send is corrupted, write (sid, message, msg) to the incoming communi-
cation tape of R. Otherwise, do nothing.
Through comparison with the first two functionalities, one can see that storing
the pending messages as a queue rather than a set disallows reordering (although
dropping is still possible through a special instruction). By design, replaying of sent
messages by the adversary is also disallowed.
7.2 Protocol for FEFO
JEFO can be realized by the following protocol, denoted by 7o, in the FcERT-hybrid
model:
* The sender Send
- On receiving (sid, init, Ik) from Z:
* Generate new YCERT session ID sid' = (Send, sid).
* Based on error rate e and a message length of k plus twice the security
parameter, calculate the resulting block length n needed by the error-
correcting code. Send (sid, init, n) to -CLOSE
* nonce +- 0
- On receiving (sid, send, msg) from Z:
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* nonce - nonce + 1
* Send (sign, sid', msg o nonce) to .FCERT
* Receive (signature, sid', msg o nonce, a) from CERT
* Using an error-correcting code with encoding function E (that has
efficient list-decoding algorithm LD), compute x E(msgononceoa).
* Send (sid", send, x) to FCLOSE-
* The receiver R
R maintains a variable n,,a, which is initially set to 0.
- On receiving (sid", message, x') from CLOSE:
* Run LD(x'), where LD is an efficient list-decoding algorithm for the
error-correcting code used. This generates a set of possible decodings,
which can be parsed as {m o n o a1, m2 o 2 o2 , ... mk o nk 0 Ok}.
* verified v- {}
* For i = 1 to k
Send (verify, sid', mi o ni, ai) to TCERT.
Receive (verified, sid', mio ni, fi) from -CERT-
If fi 1, verified e- verified U {mi o ni}
* If verified is empty, if M = {miIni = maxmjonjEverified nj} does not
contain exactly one element, or if maxmjonjeverifiedn j < nmax, out-
put nothing. Otherwise, set nmax - maXmonjEverifiednj, and output
(sid,message, m) where m is the (unique) element of M.
7.3 Proof of Security
Theorem 3. ro securely realizes .FEFO in the JYCERT, TCLOsE-hybrid model; moreover,
the simulation is perfect. That is, for every hybrid-world adversary A, there exists
an ideal-world adversary Sim such that HYBFCERTZLOSE - IDEALFEFO,simz for all
environments Z.
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Proof. Again, we define a simulator Sim that emulates execution of the hybrid-world
model, running internal copies of A, .TCERT, YCLOSE, rend, and ro. However, while
the simulators for Theorems 1 and 2 ran all of these algorithms in a black-box fashion,
in this case Sim must examine the internal workings of 7ro in order to give the correct
commands to FEFO. Once again, many aspects of the security analysis are identical
to those in the proof of Theorem 1, so we omit them here.
Sim maintains a variable n that is initially set to 0; it will periodically be updated
with the value of nmax being maintained by 7rR. Whenever the simulated copy of 7rR
outputs (sid, message, msg), Sim first checks to see if Send has been corrupted. If so,
it outputs (sid, sendNow, msg) to FEFO (thus "forcing" the output to the right value).
Otherwise, it does the following:
1. Examines the state of 7rgR and determines the new value of nmax
2. Sends nmax - n - 1 drop instructions to JFEFO.
3. Sends (sid, allow) to fEFO-
4. Sets n -- nmax.
We therefore show that the allowed message is the message decoded by the (sim-
ulated) R of 7ro.
Since every message sent by the dummy Send is sent by the simulated Send in the
same order, the nonces given to the messages by the simulated Send are an accurate
reflection of where those messages appear in the pending queue of .FEFO. That is, since
Send simply increments the nonce with each sent message, the difference between two
nonces corresponds exactly to the difference between the positions of the associated
message in the pending queue.
Since the nonce is signed along with each message and the signatures are checked
during the decoding process, .FCERT guarantees that if R outputs a message, that
message was sent with the nonce that was decoded. Since nmax is the nonce of the
previously decoded message (or 0 in the first activation), the difference between nmax
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and the nonce exactly corresponds to the number of positions between the corre-
sponding message and the head of the queue. Thus, the drop instructions followed
by a single allow cause FEFO to forward the same message as was decoded.
Since the outputs of the dummy R and the simulated R are identical, the view of
Z is identical to its view of the execution of the hybrid-world protocol.
7.4 Discussion
Like the protocol rR1, 7to uses a nonce to achieve additional message delivery guar-
antees. However, by using a specific scheme for the nonces, the protocol is able to
assign more semantics: a nonce is not only a unique identifier, but contains precise
information on message ordering as well.
Due to the fact that the nonces follow a set sequence, both 7tSend and 7ro each
maintain a constant amount of state-the maximum nonce that has been sent and
received, respectively.
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Chapter 8
J7EFS: Error-Free Storage
8.1 Definition
.FEFS keeps a local array (or hash table) pending []. Its operation proceeds as follows:
1. Upon receiving (sid, init, k) from Send:
* pending[] e-I
* Send (sid, init, ik) to the adversary.
2. Upon receiving (sid, send, T, msg) from Send:
* If msg ' {O0, 1}k, do nothing. Otherwise, continue.
* Send (sid, send, T, msg) to the adversary.
* pending [T] -- msg
3. Upon receiving (sid, receive, T) from R:
* If Send is not corrupted, send (sid, message, T, pending [T]) to R. (Note
that if a message with tag T has not been sent, pending [T] =1.)
* Otherwise, send (sid, receive, T) to the adversary. Wait for the adversary
to reply with (sid, receive, T, msg).
send (sid, message, T, msg) to R.
If msg {0, 1}k, halt.
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Otherwise,
8.2 Non-Trivial Protocols
A consequence of the syntactic definition of security in the UC framework is that
protocols which "do nothing" securely realize any ideal functionality [1]. Thus, in
order to meaningfully claim that a functionality is not realizable, we must restrict the
class of protocols to those that are somehow "useful."
In the ideal world, let a non-blocking adversary be defined as one which eventually
delivers every message from the functionality to the recipient. (This notion was first
defined in [1].)
In the FCERT, E-wT-hybrid world, define a non-blocking adversary as one which,
for each (sid, send, msg) command that is assigned tag T, eventually issues a (sid, corrupt, -, x')
command to XCWT such that A(pending [T], x') < en at the time the corrupt com-
mand is issued. That is, the adversary eventually "lets through" every message sent
to FWT, although it is allowed to corrupt them (up to error rate e). The adversary
must also deliver all messages from the -CERT functionality to their recipients. The
adversary is, however, allowed to block all regular network traffic between parties.
A protocol 7r in the EFCERT, FCwT-hybrid model non-trivially realizes a functional-
ity Y if, for every non-blocking adversary A in the .FCERT, FCwT-hybrid world, there
exists a non-blocking adversary Sim in the ideal world such that the usual indistin-
guishability property applies.
8.3 Proof of Non-Realizability
The following lemma is a well-known result in coding theory and will be useful in the
proof of the main theorem:
Lemma 1. Plotkin Bound. For any 2n + 1 strings x1,... ,x2n 1 E {0, 1}n , there
exist i, j such that i j and A(xt, xj) < n/2.
Theorem 4. YEFS cannot be non-trivially realized in the .FCERT, .FwT-hybrid world
for any e > 1/4.
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Proof. Assume there exists some protocol 7r that realizes FEFs in the CERT, CTWT-
hybrid world with > 1/4. We describe an environment Z that can distinguish
between parties Send and R running 7r and interaction with a simulator and FEFS in
the ideal world.
We first observe that in 7, every send command must result in the sender imme-
diately making at least one call to .TCWT. Consider a Z which issues repeated send
commands with random messages and random tags, and a non-blocking adversary
which immediately and trivially corrupts every message sent to Tw T. If at any
point one of these requests (say, having tag r) does not result in an immediate call to
YCWT, Z could ask A to trivially corrupt the message with tag T and then ask R to
receive that message, and then halt. In the ideal world, since Send is a dummy party,
the receiver outputs the proper message. However, in the hybrid world, R has no
information about the message; Z can therefore distinguish the two worlds based on
the output of R. This contradicts the assumption that 7r non-trivially realizes FEFS-
We now describe a Z that can distinguish in the general case. After initiating
the system, Z issues repeated send commands with random messages and random
tags. Additionally, Z instructs A to never issue a corrupt command to .FrWT for
any tag not generated by Z.1 Z continues until two distinct messages, mi and mj,
result in strings xi and xj being sent to TCWT that are within Hamming distance 2en
of each other, where n is the length of the encoded messages. Since 2en > n/2, the
Plotkin bound implies that Z can find two such strings mi and mj within 2n + 1 send
commands. Denote the tags of mi and mj by Ti and Tj respectively.
Define M(xi, xj) to be some canonical value such that A(xi, M(xi, xj)) < and
A(xj, M(xi, xj)) < e). Z then chooses r to be equal to either i or Tj at random with
equal probability and instructs the adversary to send (sid, corrupt, , M(xi, xj)) to
.FCWT. Z then instructs R to receive the message with tag T.
If the environment is interacting with Sim and EFS in the ideal world, the ideal
finctionality will, by definition, always return the message correctly corresponding
to T when the dummy R issues the receive command. If, however, the environment
1This is necessary to prevent a protocol from embedding information in the tags.
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is interacting with parties in the hybrid world, R may request several tags from
JZWT, but since the tags are assigned randomly, T is the only one which will result
in any useful information. R must then choose which message to return. Since T is
independent of the M(xi, xj) value R receives, the correct output is mi or mj with
equal likelihood. Thus, any method R uses to select which method to output must
give the incorrect message with probability at least 1/2.
Thus, with significant probability, Z can distinguish between interaction with
JEFS and interaction with any simulator Sim. Therefore, 9EFS cannot be realized by
any protocol in the FCERT, .ECwT-hybrid model for e > 1/4.
8.4 Discussion
Unlike the previous functionalities for error-free communication, FEFS is not realizable
under higher error rates than those provided by classical coding theory. The reason
for this is that the receiver, not the adversary, chooses the message to be received.
Under the transmission-like functionalities, the adversary could choose to make the
receiver decode to any of a number of messages, but since each of these messages was
indeed sent by the sender, the behavior was considered correct.
In the storage model, however, the receiver wants a specific message sent by the
sender. The adversary is thus able to make the receiver decode to a different message
(or at least to cause ambiguity between several messages)-although all the messages
the receiver is considering were indeed validly sent by Send, the receiver does not
know which message is the one he actually wants at the moment. Thus, the stricter
requirements of the receiver in the storage model cause the functionality to be unre-
alizable.
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